

Text of Memo on Indian-Pakistan

WASHINGTON, Jan. 14—Following is the text of a memorandum on a meeting of a National Security Council committee on Indian-Pakistani hostilities, made public today by the columnist Jack Anderson:

SECRET/SENSITIVE

THE JOINT STAFF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301
8 DECEMBER 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Washington Special Action Group meeting on Indo-Pakistan hostilities; 8 December 1971

1. The N.S.C. Washington Special Action Group met in the Situation Room, the White House, at 1100, Wednesday, 8 December to consider the Indo-Pakistan situation. The meeting was chaired by Dr. Kissinger.

2. ATTENDEES

A. PRINCIPALS. Dr. Henry Kissinger, Mr. Richard Helms, C.I.A., Gen. John Ryan, J.C.S., Mr. Donald MacDonald, A.I.D., Mr. David Packard, Defense, Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson, State.

B. OTHERS: Mr. Maurice Williams, A.I.D., Mr. John Waller, C.I.A., Col. Richard Kennedy, N.S.C., Mr. Samuel Hoskanson, N.S.C., Mr. Harold Saunders, N.S.C., Mr. Armistead Selden, Defense, Mr. James Noyes, Defense, Mr. Christopher Van Hollen, State, Mr. Samuel De Palma, State, Mr. Bruce Laingen, State, Mr. David Schneider, State, Mr. Joseph Sisco, State, Rear Adm. Robert Welander, O.J.C.S., Capt. Howard Kay, O.J.C.S.

Group 4 downgraded at 3-year intervals; declassified after 12 years.

3. Summary. Dr. Kissinger suggested that India might be attempting, through calculated destruction of Pak armored and air forces to render Pakistan impotent. He requested that the Jordanian interest in assisting Pakistan not be turned off, but rather kept in a holding pattern. He asked that Pak capabilities in Kashmir be assessed.

4. Mr. Helms opened the meeting by briefing the current situation. In the East, the Indians have broken the line at Comilla. Only major river crossings prevent them from investing Dacca. The Indians are advancing rapidly throughout East Pakistan. All major Pak L.O.C.'s in the



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East are now vulnerable. In the West, the Paks are now claiming Punch, inside the Indian border. However, the Paks are admitting fairly heavy casualties in the fighting. Tank battles are apparently taking place in the Sind/Rajasthan area. Mrs. Gandhi has indicated that before heeding a U.N. call for cease-fire, she intends to straighten out the southern border of Azad Kashmir. It is reported that prior to terminating present hostilities, Mrs. Gandhi intends to attempt to eliminate Pakistan's armor and air force capabilities. Thus far only India and Bhutan have recognized Bangladesh. It is believed that the Soviets have held off recognition primarily so as not to rupture relations with the Paks. Soviet action on the matter of recognition, however, may be forthcoming in the near future.

5. Mr. Sisco inquired how long the Paks might be expected to hold out in East Pakistan, to which Mr. Helms replied 48 to 72 hours. The time to reach the ultimate climax is probably a function of the difficulties encountered in river crossings.

6. Assessing the situation in the West, General Ryan indicated that he did not see the Indians pushing too hard at this time, rather they seem to be holding back.

7. Dr. Kissinger asked how long it would take to shift Indian forces from East to West. General Ryan said it might take a reasonably long time to move all the forces, but that the airborne brigade could be moved quickly, probably within a matter of five or six days.

8. Dr. Kissinger inquired about refugee aid. After a discussion with Mr. Williams it was determined that only a very small number of U.S. dollars earmarked for refugee relief was actually entering the Indian economy. Contrary to the sense of the last meeting, the Indians have actually lost foreign exchange in the process of caring for refugees. In any event, the entire relief effort is currently suspended in both India and Pakistan.

9. Dr. Kissinger then emphasized that the President has made it clear that no further foreign exchange, PL-480 commodities, or development loans could be assigned to India without approval of the White House. Mr. Williams stated there was no problem of anything sliding through.

10. Dr. Kissinger inquired what the next turn of the screw might be. Mr. Williams said that the only other possible option was taking a position concerning aid material currently under contract. This however would be a very messy problem inasmuch as we would be dealing with irrevocable letters of credit. Mr. Williams further stated that we would have to take possession of material that was being consigned to the Indians by U.S. contractors and thus would be compelled to pay U.S. suppliers, resulting in claims against the U.S.G.

11. Mr. Packard said that all of this could be done, but agreed that it would be a very laborious and difficult problem. He further elaborated that all the items involved would have to be located, the United States would have to take ownership, settle with suppliers, locate warehousing, etc. Nevertheless, if such was desired it could be done. Mr. Williams said that in a very limited way this type of action had been taken against some Mid-East countries, but that it had taken years to settle the claims.

12. Dr. Kissinger asked how India was handling next year's development loan pro-

gram, responded that nothing was under negotiation at the present time.

13. Dr. Kissinger inquired about next year's [A.I.D.] budget. Mr. Williams stated that what goes into the budget did not represent a commitment. Dr. Kissinger stated that current orders are not to put anything into the budget for A.I.D. to India. It was not to be leaked that A.I.D. had put money in the budget for India, only to have the "wicked" White House take it out.

14. Dr. Kissinger suggested that the key issue if the Indians turn on West Pakistan is Azad Kashmir. If the Indians smash the Pak air force and the armored forces we would have a deliberate Indian attempt to force the disintegration of Pakistan. The elimination of the Pak armored and air forces would make the Paks defenseless. It would turn West Pakistan into a client state. The possibility elicits a number of questions. Can we allow a U.S. ally to go down completely while we participate in a blockade? Can we allow the Indians to scare us off, believing that if U.S. supplies are needed they will not be provided?

15. Mr. Sisco stated that if the situation were to evolve as Dr. Kissinger had indicated then, of course, there was a serious risk to the viability of West Pakistan. Mr. Sisco doubted, however, that the Indians had this as their objective. He indicated that Foreign Minister Singh told Ambassador Keating that India had no intention of taking any Pak territory. Mr. Sisco said it must also be kept in mind that Kashmir is really disputed territory.

16. Mr. Helms then stated that earlier he had omitted mentioning that Madame Gandhi, when referring to China, expressed the hope that there would be no Chinese intervention in the West. She said that the Soviet had cautioned her that the Chinese might rattle the sword in Laddakh but that the Soviets have promised to take appropriate counteraction if this should occur. Mr. Helms indicated that there was no Chinese build-up at this time but, nevertheless, even without a build-up they could rattle the sword.

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